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Due primarily to the nature of the business, it is a question of policy
for the courts to decide, whether they will extend the custody theory,
to cover property lost anywhere on the premises of a safety deposit
company. WILLIAM CREME.
SALES
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FOOD SOLD IN A RESTAURANT - SALE
OR SERVICE - JOINDER OF ACTIONS
The plaintiff's husband purchased a sandwich in defendant's restau-
rant, ate it and died of ptomaine poisoning caused by it. Notice of the
death was given by plaintiff after her appointment as administratrix.
The petition contained counts based upon negligence and implied war-
ranty of fitness of food for human consumption. Recovery was had
on the latter count, no negligence having been proved. Schuler v.
Union News Co., (Mass. 1936), 4 N.E. (2d) 465.
In the early law, an innkeeper was not liable for food served a
patron on theory of implied warranty, but he was liable for negligence
in its preparation. Beale, Innkeepers, Sec. 169; Keilway, 91; I Willis-
ton on "Sales" (2d Ed.) Sec. 242b. A majority of the courts of last
resort still refuse to hold hotels and restaurants liable upon an implied
warranty of food sold for human consumption. Meriill v. Hodson,
88 Conn 314, 9 Ad. 533 (I914); Rickner v. Ritz Restaurant, 13
N. J. Mis., 818, 181 Atl. 398 (1935); Nisky v. Child's Co., 103
N.J.L. 464, 135 Ad. 805 (1927); Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed.
519 (1914); Rowe v. Louisville N.R. Co., 29 Ga. App. 151, 113
S.E. 823 (1922); Travis v. Louisville R. Co., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So.
851 (1913); Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 l. 518, 45 N.E. 253
(1896); Burkhardt v. Arnion Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 At. 385
(1932). "The question is supposed to depend on whether the restaurant
keeper made a 'sale' to the customer of the injurious food." I Willis-
ton on "Sales" (2d Ed.) Sec. 2426. If it is a sale it comes within Sec.
15 (I) of the Uniform Sales Act and there is an implied warranty.
Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. 551, 149 N.E. 182 (1925); Smith v.
Carlos, 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S.W. 468 (1923); Barrington v.
Hotel Astor, 184 N.Y. App. 317, 171 N.Y.S. 840 (1919); West v.
Katspanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 Ad. 685 (1932); Goetten v.
Owl Drug Co., 49 Pac. (2d) 286 (1935); Smith v. Geerish, 256
Mass. 183, 152 N.E. 318 (1926). But if it is not a sale then it is a
rendition of service and there is no implied warranty. The courts which
refuse to imply a warranty do so on the theory that restaurants render
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services and do not sell food. Louch v. Morley, 39 Cal. App. 633,
179 Pac. 529 (1919); Nisky v. Child's Co., supra; Kennedy v. Len,
81 N.H. 427, 128 Adt. 343 (1925); Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 98
A.L.R. 681, 74 Fed. (2d) 139 (934); McCarley v. Wood Drug
Co., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (934); Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co.,
1"7 Conn. 128, I3, 167 Ad. 99 (933); Merrill v. Hodson, supra;
Sheifer v. Willoughby, supra; Valeri v. Pullman Co., supra. Two cases
in Massachusetts have held that there is an implied warranty of food
served in a restaurant whether it is a sale of food or rendition of services.
Friend v. Child's Co., 231 Mass. 65, 12o N.E. 407 (1918); Barring-
er v. Ocean S. S. Co., 240 Mass. 405, 134 N. E. 265 (1922). But in
an early decision, the Massachusetts court held that a public caterer at a
dance hall was not liable on implied warranty for food sold. Bishop v.
Webber, 139 Mass. 411, i N.E. 154 (1885). In Ohio there is only
one case in point, Clark Restaurant Co. v. Simmon, 29 Ohio App. 220,
163 N.E. 21o (1927), which while based on a pure food statute, Ohio
Gen. Code, Sec. 1276o, holds that a restaurant makes a sale of food to
a patron rather than a sale of services. This case cannot be distinguished
on this point from those cases where recovery was sought on the theory
of an implied warranty.
The minority view is well established in New York and Massa-
chusetts, these jurisdictions holding that there is an implied warranty
upon food sold in a restaurant. These courts have enlarged their con-
cept of "sale" to include a meal purchased and consumed in a hotel or
restaurant. Leahy v. Essex Co., 164 lq.Y. App. 903, 148 N.Y.S.
1o63 (1914); Muller v. Child's Co., I85 N.Y. App. 881, 171 N.Y.S.
541 (1918); Smith v. Carlos, supra; Friend v. Child's Co., supra;
Barrington v. Hoteld stor, supra; Cushing v. Rodman, 82 Fed. (2d)
864 (1936). But the Maine court has held that there is no liability
based upon an implied warranty of canned goods served by a restaurant,
since the buyer can hardly be said to rely upon the seller's judgment
under such circumstances. Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R. Co., Iio
Me. 105, 85 At. 396 (1912). One court which has refused to hold
the restaurateur upon an implied warranty, has suggested in a dictum
that food sold in a drug store is warranted fit for human consumption.
Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., supra, citing Race v. Krum, 22 N.Y. 410,
ix8 N.E. 853 (1918). The distinction suggested was that where food
may be eaten either on the premises or taken away this constitutes a sale.
This distinction would seem to be valid in cases involving "automats"
and similar food dispensing agencies.
The principal case also raises the question as to the propriety of
joining a count based upon negligence with one founded upon an implied
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warranty. Historically, "Warranty in its early stages was in tort and
recovery by an action of deceit," 2 Ohio St. L.J. 18o. But beginning
with the case of Stuart v. Wilkins- I Doug. 18 (1778), an action in
assumpsit was allowed. "The action on a warranty is a hybrid be-
tween tort and contract," 3 Williston "Contracts" p. 1505. "In
pleading the warranty, the allegation may be framed in two counts,
one in contracts and one in tort," 2 Ohio St. L.J. I8o, I8x; Davies
v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920);
Back v. Dixon, 1I5 Minn. 172, 131 N.W. 1078 (1911); Mayerhoff
v. Wortman, 92 Okla. 66, 218 Pac. 842 (1923). There still seems to
be doubt in the minds of some courts whether these actions can properly
be joined. The majority of the courts which have passed on this matter
allow a joinder. Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271,
84 N.E. 481 (19o8); Needham v. Halverson, 22 N.D. 594, 135
N.W 203 (1912); .des v. Wash, u99 Ky. 687, 251 S.W. 970
(1923). Some courts have forced the plaintiff to elect, Van Tassel v.
Beecher, 28 N.Y.S. 73 (1894). The minority of the courts do not
permit a joinder of the two courts in torts and implied warranty.
Montgomery v. Alexander Lumber Co., I4O Ga. 51, 78 S.E. 413
(1913); Pridemore v. Fife, 178 Mo. App. 332, 165 S.W. 1155
(1914). But Ohio permits an action in tort and contract to be joined
when they arise out of the same transaction. Sturges v. Burton, 8 Ohio
St. 215 (1848). It would seem that under this doctrine, counts based
upon negligence and warranty such as were joined in the principal case
would be good in Ohio. R. W. VANDEMARK.
WILLS
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - UNDUE INFLUENCE
In an action to set aside a will it was disclosed that the testator was
a man of the age of seventy-nine and afflicted with some of the ills that
flesh is heir to; that he was childish; that he was forgetful and occasion-
ally got lost in close proximity to his own home; and that frequently he
did not know his intimate friends, or knowing them refused to speak to
them even when they were present as guests in his own house.
The legatee, a blood relative of testator's deceased wife, visited his
house at least once a week after the death of his wife, cleaned the house,
sent out the laundry, and cooked for him. During the last illness she
remained at his home, continually looking after him. It was also shown
that the testator referred to her as the "boss," called her a hog to want
all his property, and that she, during testator's last illness, a year and a
